Article published in Tel Quel / December 2009
Exclusive. Sahara, the secret file
On November 6, 1975 officially begins the Green March. Over 30 years later, thanks to gradually declassified archives, is just beginning to understand better the planning and the impact of this event remained unmatched worldwide. TelQuel had access to the memoranda of diplomatic negotiations led by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during the period 1974-1976. They shed new light on the nature of Moroccan-Algerian relations, the psychology of the great protagonists of the Green March, and many more.
By Suleiman Bencheikh
Moroccans will long remember this glorious epic conducted by some 350 000 volunteers from different social strata, representing all regions of the kingdom, who answered the call to begin this March to release the Sahara from the yoke of the occupying English with "weapons" are peaceful as the national flag, the Koran and the attachment to the virtues of peace to defend their stolen rights. " With these words, more than 30 years after the fact, the official press commemorates the anniversary of the Green March. This shows the extent of the success of Hassan II, who was thought to detail. As the figure of 350,000, which is also symbolic: it represents the number of births that occurred in Morocco in 1975, equivalent an entire generation of youth of a country that Hassan II himself called "the solemn harvest that God gives us to bring the country a land that we have never forgotten."
Cold War and decolonization
In 1975, the situation of English Sahara leaves already larger-indifferent world. As in other hotspots around the globe, is the partition of the Cold War being played, the risk of domino effect understood. Algeria, secured to both the Non-Aligned and the Soviet bloc, chose the opposite camp in Morocco, he has eyes turned to Uncle Sam that time, everyone knows that too visible support of one or another great power ( U.S. and USSR) would almost logically warrior gear. Thus, in his memoirs, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, U.S. representative to the UN during the crisis of 1975, compares the parallel stories of Timor Leste and Western Sahara: "China has supported Fretilin in Timor, and lost. English Sahara, Russia has also clearly supported Algeria and his movement, known as Polisario, and lost. In both cases, United States wanted a change as has taken place and have worked in this direction. " Moynihan is the same that we owe this joke illustrating the prevailing anti-Bolshevism in the U.S.: "If the USSR gained a foothold in the Sahara, the sand there soon enough."
strategies in the presence
The time is thus the balance of superpowers, but the time is also the recent African decolonization. Spain has kept a foot in the Sahara. But in 1965, the United Nations shall decide first on the necessary decolonization of the territory. A year later, the same UN calls to hold a referendum on self-determination. The time of the English presence on African soil is now short. Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania sharpen their weapons while following closely the legal case. When the International Court of Justice, seized by Morocco, makes a notice acknowledging the ties of allegiance between the Sahrawi people and the Moroccan sultans before the English colonization, Hassan II believed held in hand a blank check. Algerian side, we prefers to stress the need for a referendum on self-determination, advocated by both the UN and the ICJ. Mauritanian side, we are content to support Morocco's claims over areas that had the kingdom with ethnic and historical ties, and to satisfy the reciprocity Moroccan. Never mind, the day of the verdict of the ICJ, Hassan II announced in a televised address to the nation, he himself will lead 350,000 Moroccan civilians gathered in a peaceful and green Power up weapons 'to Laayoune.
Spain withdraws
At the time of the Green March, General Franco's dying. In the relationship that makes his experience in the Sahara, Andre Lewin, spokesman for the UN in charge of a diplomatic mission to Franco, described thus: "Very weak, thin, trembling hand, drinking his glass sherry or flipping distractedly his record, but still firm in his attitude and his words as closely buttoned up in his dress uniform had become too big for him. " He continued: "I was impressed to hear this man in power for nearly forty years - a power that had arisen specifically from troops stationed at the time the English Sahara and the Canary Islands - say with a tinge of regret in his voice, but firmly, that 'if these people want no more of Spain, it is clear that Spain must go ". The state of health of Franco has undoubtedly provided an opportunity for Hassan II. Even if the Caudillo had already resolved to abandon the Sahara, the arrival of Juan Carlos on the throne completely changing. He takes the Acting October 30, one week of Green March, even before the official death of Franco. A month later, the English withdrawal from the Sahara already well under way, the foreign minister of the new king is responsible for negotiating with the U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The minutes of trading shows that Spain has sought a strong signal from the United States as a token of friendship to the new American leaders, eager to abandon neutrality and Franco dock block in the West: if Spain left Africa, it is to be redeployed to Europe, in the crosshairs, a Military cooperation with the Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO).
mission Waldheim
few days before the Green March, the UN secretary general Kurt Waldheim, charge his spokesman, Andrew Lewin, mission almost impossible to convince Hassan II, already very excited about his big project, to waive the Green March. In his wallet, Lewin has little or nothing: a plan that responds to almost all requirements and has the Algerian therefore almost no chance of being accepted by Hassan II. "(King) came to meet me, he was visibly tense, feverish, but his eyes shone with an inner flame and great vivacity, recalls Lewin. He wore a dark robe. Me his hand, he smiled, saying that despite his condition, his fatigue and his many charges, he had insisted on having me as a sign of respect for the United Nations. " After this interview, Lewin will long be marked by the strong tone of Hassan II. The monarch would have in effect said, essentially, that if the UN tried to interfere, they would impede the march of history and should bear the consequences. At worst, Hassan II has even indicated a willingness to leave the United Nations, saying the peaceful nature of its business. In doing so, he pretended to ignore at the same time, the Royal Armed Forces (under the command of a certain Ahmed Dlimi) were stationed in the Sahara. Objective: to secure and occupy strategic points but also conduct a real military operation against the newly formed Frente Polisario.
Hassan II's victory
the end, only a few thousand patriots (About 350,000 "green walkers") leave the camps and Tan Tan Tarfaya to travel a distance of 15 km in the desert, before the retreat order is given by Hassan II, who is negotiating behind the scenes with Spaniards. On 9 November, in a speech to Agadir, the king ends the Green March: "March has fulfilled its mission, its objectives and achieved what we and our friends were waiting. It behooves us then, dear people, to return all our starting point, to deal in another way and with new methods. " Hassan II's victory is, above all, that of having avoided worse at a time when the Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, do not hesitate to use the risk of an escalating situation, or even genocide. At the risk of war with Algeria was added that of civilian casualties that were hovering fields of land mines planted by the English in preparation for their withdrawal. The victory of Hassan II is also symbolic: an incredible gamble, the king has recovered his throne and gave it an aura of incredible.
"So, do you think I was right to act like I did, convinced it was for the good of my country? "asks Hassan II Lewin, once the march ended. Answer: "Sire, I think you will succeed in the short term this may seem like an extraordinary gamble, and that the near future you will be proved right, but many principles are invoked and many forces gang up to stop you sustain your success and strive to make you pay. The risk to you is therefore in the longer term. Will you then be able to cope? ". To meditate.
The fury of Boumediene and Bouteflika
The fact that the wrath of Algerian leaders is at its peak. The archives of Kissinger shows the determination of bargaining Bouteflika, who accused his American counterpart for supporting the Green March. In December 1975 he criticizes Kissinger, with a very undiplomatic language, not to keep the embargo in Morocco, in particular for having supplied weapons and dollars. Throughout the duration of operations, the President Houari Boumediene, he, in all its forms. The Secretary General of the UN is also the echo from Kissinger, the extreme tension prevailing in both camps: "The emotion is at its peak and that means trouble calmly discuss the situation. The emotion is really great in the king himself. (...) Now, the reaction of President Boumediene is very serious. I've never seen as angry and uncontrollable at that time. I had several meetings with him, and he has always been full control ". Ultimately, if the Green March was a success for Hassan II, successive governments in Algeria in veiled reproach him for not being a shared victory. It is without doubt Boumediene excluding its pact with the Mauritanian President Ould Daddah, Hassan II has offered a "best enemy" who survives him: the dinosaur Bouteflika Algerian resentment continues today.
Unpublished Documents. The archives of Kissinger
Confidential Reporting of diplomatic missions or reports of discussions with his staff, records of Kissinger is a goldmine. They abound in "quotes" that shed light on new light on the strategies involved. Senghor Hassan II, through Bouteflika and Waldheim, the declassified archive but unpublished, show both the American double game, the determination to thwart the ambitions Algerian Moroccan, and the opportunity taken by Spain to dock NATO. All in a context of green markets, and amid Cold War. Selections, tasty and unique!
Meeting Kissinger / Cortina y Mauri, 9 October 1974 in Torrejon, Spain.
The Foreign Minister Franco accuses Kissinger of promoting the aims of the Moroccan Sahara. The response from U.S. Secretary of State is scathing.
Kissinger: We have no view on the English Sahara. I have already said privately that as a political scientist, the future of English Sahara I do not seem to be particularly brilliant. (...) The world can survive without the English Sahara. It will not be part of the countries that make a great contribution. (...)
There was a time in my life where I did not even know the whereabouts of the Sahara, and I was none the less happy today.
Cortina Before we discovered the phosphates!
Meeting Hassan II / Kissinger, 15 October 1974 at the royal palace in Rabat.
A month after the referral by Morocco of the International Court of Justice in The Hague on the historical ties of allegiance between the English Sahara and the sultans Alawi, Hassan II research support U.S..
Hassan II Any peaceful solution will be welcomed with great joy on our side, as long as it meets our security objectives. We do not ask our friends to take sides or make judgments about who is right and who is wrong. We simply ask them to consider the proposals made by both sides and then encouraging the most realistic proposal. The Moroccan proposal to the International Court of Justice case, in our opinion, both realistic and also legally and politically correct. Depending on the degree to which the U.S. share our point of view, we ask them to intervene in favor of the law, equality and the future. Because, let's objectives, Spain will remain geographically where it is and Morocco will remain where it is located. The result is inevitable. So if we can win one, or two or three years of tension, it would be nice.
Kissinger: I am sure that Her Majesty will be working during the summit (summit of Arab nations hosted in Rabat at the same time, ie) in the direction of the realistic possibility peace, and this reassures me. I can assure His Majesty that his reasoning and his suggestions will be of great influence in our actions when I return after the Rabat summit.
On the English Sahara, I was very impressed by the statement of His Majesty (August 20). The United States wants an amicable resolution to the problem. Recourse to the ICJ is a constructive outcome. We will strongly advise our English friends to opt for a friendly solution.
[after Hassan II invited to visit the United States on behalf President Ford]:
We will not be able to live up to the hospitality of Her Majesty but we will do our best within the confines of our under-developed country (sic).
Meeting Kissinger / Bouteflika of December 17, 1975 at the residence of U.S. Ambassador in Paris.
A month after the success of the Green March, Abdelaziz Bouteflika complaining of U.S. support to Morocco. The Algerian ambassador (Sabbagh in the text) is present.
Kissinger: I do not understand what self-determination mean for the Sahara. I can understand what it means for the Palestinians but is a slightly different problem (...).
We do not have an anti-Algerian. The only question was how much to invest. Prevent the Green March would have meant completely deteriorate our relations with Morocco, in effect an embargo.
Bouteflika: You could do it. You would could stop the economic and military aid.
Kissinger: But that would have meant the total destruction of our relations with Morocco.
Bouteflika: No, the king of Morocco would not ally with the Soviets.
Kissinger: But we do not have much interest in the Sahara.
Bouteflika: But you have interests in Spain and Morocco ...
Kissinger: And in Algeria.
Bouteflika: And you have promoted a.
Kissinger: I do not think we have helped some, we tried to stay out of it.
Bouteflika: Your role has never been marginal or uninteresting because, obviously, there was a military cooperation with Morocco. Therefore, you can not be neutral between Morocco and Algeria. So I understand that you had to promote, or seeming to encourage, Morocco because of that.
Kissinger: (at Sabbagh) But what the foreign minister complains, is that we do not favor Algeria. To take this position, we would have had to completely reverse our positions. (...)
Let me think about the referendum issue. Especially if it is not conditioned by the withdrawal of [Moroccan] before a referendum.
Bouteflika: Yes, you said, if the withdrawal is not a condition for holding a referendum. But it also provided that there is fairly strong guarantees on the fact that people can decide freely. You know, murders can be common. We do not want a problem. Genocide.
Kissinger: the Sahara?
Bouteflika: I am completely categorical. This is a problem of interest. I do not know why Mauritania wants borders like this or why Algeria should be afraid. it is not healthy. If Morocco and Mauritania share the Sahara, this is not politics.
Meeting Kissinger / Senghor 1 May 1976 at the presidential palace in Dakar.
few months after the Green March, the U.S. secretary of state talks with Senegalese President important ally in Africa. The goal is to find a solution to the Sahara conflict that is acceptable to Algeria.
Senghor There is a way that meets people's views: a consultation is made with the UN as an observer. To accept the principle of a referendum for self determination. A party was organized by Morocco and Mauritania by another. It seems otherwise, it would lead to war. At the beginning of the Afro-Arab conference here in Dakar in April, we provoked discussion among foreign ministers of Morocco and Mauritania. I tell you to show you that we have worked. He is now talking to Algeria to save face.
Kissinger: The Algeria entertain a resolution organized by Morocco and Mauritania?
Senghor If this happened under UN supervision.
Kissinger: What would be the outcome?
Senghor autonomy within Morocco, Mauritania in part no doubt prefer independence. Two resolutions for the UN. A portion (the Sahara, ed) would go to Morocco and the other would choose independence.
Kissinger: Integration in Morocco?
Senghor I think, yes.
Kissinger: But Algeria insist Does not that there are three options: integration into Algeria, integration with Morocco or independence ?
Senghor We're discussing it.
Kissinger: This would only be yes or not to integrate?
Senghor Either yes or no to independence. As in Morocco or Mauritania.
Kissinger: you think you can get to it?
Senghor I'll try. It is essential that they are not fighting. Algerians do not express their opinions very clearly. I need not tell you if there is a war, the Soviet Union will intervene and the West can not remain outside. (...)
Nigeria and Algeria are trying to introduce the Arabs in Africa to destroy the "negritude" to impose Arab imperialism (...)
Kissinger: Which countries can we base our policy?
Senghor Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia ...
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